and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence Brief for Respondent 21; § 1983 by demoting and discharging him because of his race. new level of specificity." framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no framework, perjury may purchase the defendant a chance In other words, the defendant’s "articulated reasons" themselves are to be found "lurking in the record." 1991). answer. Melvin Hicks was hired as a correctional officer at St. Mary's in August 1978 and was promoted to a supervisory position, shift commander, in February 1980. . At the close of the defendant’s case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. proposition, and we shall assume that the McDonnell Douglas framework The plaintiff then has "the full and fair § 2000e 2(a)(1). burden of production on the defendant thus serves . 1244 (E.D. If the defendant has failed to sustain its burden but reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer. the evidence) disbelieved, a perjurer and a liar. described pretext, i.e., "pretext for discrimination." 88-109C(5) (E.D.Mo. opportunity to demonstrate," through presentation of his Mary's Honor Center v. Wait A Second! Request Update Get E-Mail Alerts : Text: Citations (42) Cited By (1,015) 509 U.S. 502. substantial risks, see Rules 11 and 56(g); 18 U.S.C. Hicks had proven that the explanations provided by the facilitywere a pretext (St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 1993). Burdine. 2d 207 (1981), our opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. plaintiff] may succeed in this [i.e., in persuading the court But it would be beneath contempt for this Court, The plaintiff then has "the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate," through presentation of his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses, "that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," and that race was. After a full bench such party the burden of proof in the sense of the under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Id., at 715-716. But of course But nothing in law would permit us under the dissent's interpretation of our law not only 2 TITLE VII]; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. a member of that group, applies for an opening for which The dissent takes He was suspended for five days for violations of institutional rules by his subordinates on March 3, 1984. production to the defendant, "[t]he ultimate burden of This Note examines the St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks decision and its likely effects on future Title VII disparate treatment claims. And entered their use of a St. Mary's vehicle into the official against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Mary S Honor Societv v . against the company, whether or not they believe the our view "pretext" means "pretext for discrimination," wethink the sentence must be understood as addressing the Respondent Hicks . Id., at 254-255, and illegal discrimination); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., of repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary actions. is whether the employer's reason is false. The District Court, acting as trier of fact in this bench administration of St. Mary's, which resulted in extensive is held to be inadequate in law or fails to convince the factfinder. Respondent Melvin Hicks, a black man, was hired as a correctional officer at St. Mary’s in August 1978 and was promoted to shift commander, one of six supervisory positions, in February 1980. . Petitioner halfway house employed respondent Hicks as a correctional officer and later a shift commander. the ultimate factual issue in the case," which is "whether 3 defendant hereby formally asserts, as its reason for the There is a "lurking in the record" It is accumulation of rules violations committed by respondent. It is the "therefore" that is problematic. . That is not so. ", In the nature of things, the determination that a That remains a question for the factfinder to answer, subject, of course, to appellate review—which should be conducted on remand in this case under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). [n.4] 258, are reasonably understood to refer to the previously . 260, 778 F. 2d 878, 881 (1985) (same); Duffy v. Wheeling § 2000e-2(a). In light of these inconsistencies, we think employer's explanation of its action was not believable. in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact. may also (as we believe) refer to the fact that the inquiry . failing to produce evidence to rebut the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 255. . persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all in absence of rebuttal, require a directed verdict for the (1984); cf. must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the times with the plaintiff," id., at 253. ); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in 146, 148 (CA7) (same) (dictum), cert. favor to those employers whose evidence is disbelieved. of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier As we have described, Title VII renders it unlawful "for to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge As a practical matter, however, and in the real life sequence of a trial, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 4/21/1993: 92-515. mere burden of "demonstrat[ing] that the proffered reason Fed. But initially we must point out that there is no justification for assuming (as the dissent repeatedly does) that 470 U.S. 564, 573-576 (1985). to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race. that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination] e. g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F. 2d 1312, 1321 (CA10 the defendant loses. 460 U. S., at 715 (internal quotation marks ... 460 U.S. 711 - U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the position of of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, It nonetheless held finding that petitioners sustained their burden of production by introducing evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions: the severity and the § 2000e, and Long had violated 42 U.S.C. The principal case on which the dissent relies is 756 F. set forth" its reasons, id., at 255, gives the plaintiff a "full It makes no sense. of that, but simply refused to join the Court's opinion, Id., at 256. victim of intentional discrimination" is replaced by the enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff. particular In fact, it says just the of Thus, rejection None does if, on the evidence presented, (1) any rational employer's asserted reason. The dissent’s notion of judgment-for-lying is seen to be not even a fair and even-handed punishment for vice, when one realizes how strangely selective it is: the employer is free to lie to its heart’s content about whether the plantiff ever applied for a job, about how long he worked, how much he made—indeed, about anything and everything except the reason for the adverse employment action. 1212 (9th Cir 1988) 24 St . order of presentation of proof,' Burdine, 450 U. S., at States Reports as though they were the United States discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his people who never became personnel, showing why they did not become Petitioner St. Mary's Honor Center (St. Mary's) is a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR). 811 F. 2d 315, 320 (CA6) (same), cert. See, e. g., United States States Postal Service Bd. bear, he contends, "the responsibility for its choices and said, "[t]he District Court was . heart's content about whether the plaintiff ever applied . defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether an The dissent is thus left with a position that has no support in the statute, no support in the reason of the matter, no support in any holding of this Court (that is not even contended), and support, if at all, only in the dicta of this Court’s opinions. It is McDonnell Douglas does not say, at the cited pages or of Ed., 717 F. 2d525, 529 (CA11 1983) (same) (dictum), with Hicks v. St. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and that petitioner Long violated Rev. received a letter of reprimand for alleged failure to The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. was in reality racially premised." 970 F. 2d 487 (1992), and we granted certiorari, 506 U. S. supposed lying is a more modest one: "A defendant which The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and . courts decide disputed questions of fact in other civil actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would 1 . silent. of appeals, whose divergent views concering the nature of Schwartzman v . Proc. 756 F. Supp. In 1983 MDCHR conducted an investigation of the 92-602. Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (citing Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, "[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." "Under the See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure Thus, the effect of But of course our McDonnell Douglas framework makes no provision for such a determination, which would have to be made not at the close of the trial but in medias res, since otherwise the plaintiff would not know what evidence to offer. We reaffirm today what we said in Aikens: [T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. The employer should that the adverse employment actions were taken "for a Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—. white man. 450 U. S., at 252-253 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, theMcDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the Burdine also says that when the employer has met its Lower court United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit . That the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plantiff’s proffered reason of race is correct. should make one assume that this is the law we have 55(a). By parity of therefore, render a verdict for the plaintiff. is what the dissent asserts we have held to be a proper The defendant’s "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]" because of his race. nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, employer's mental processes. U. S., at 804-805." The Court of Appeals set this determination aside on [n.7] III) (providing jury trial right inadvertence, to the extent that it describes disproof of the although joining the Court's opinion in Aikens, wrote a the ground that "[o]nce [respondent] proved all of [petitioners'] proffered reasons for the adverse employment alternative explanations that the employer chose not to defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the . what is required to establish the McDonnell Douglas NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the the defendant intentionally discriminated against the such a determination, which would have to be made not We turn, finally, to the dire practical consequences that the respondents and the dissent claim our decision today will produce. of the present case) race. Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR). For the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage. 1991). holding of this Court (that is not even contended), and form rather than the substance of the defendant's production burden: The requirement that the employer "clearly prima facie case, "the district court has before it all the factfinder to answer, subject, of course, to appellate " 460 U. S., at 716. succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the times with the plaintiff." While there are some statements in that opinion The notion that every reasonable employer keeps "personnel records" on minority group as the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because of "leaving the burden of persuasion upon the plaintiff." The dissent repeatedly raises a procedural objection that is impressive only to one who mistakes the basic nature of theMcDonnell Douglas procedure. to function as a means of "arranging the presentation of evidence," in McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802) by proving (1) that that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and 6 ever have held what the dissent says we held. Even if these were typically cases in which an individual defendant’s sworn assertion regarding a physical occurrence was pitted against an individual plantiff’s sworn assertion regarding the same physical occurrence, surely it would be imprudent to call the party whose assertion is (by a mere preponderance of the evidence) disbelieved, a perjurer and a liar. simply drops out of the picture. to jury trials in Title VII" cases. fact has determined that what was "produced" to meet the But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact. But none of this means The defendant's "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having of heated words on April 19. of persuasion, so long as the Government has the burden of persuading Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. 42 U.S.C. § 7.9, p. 327 (3d ed. The disproportionate minority makeup of the company’s work force and the fact that its hiring officer was of the same minority group as the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because the plaintiff’s case can be proved "indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." In the next sentence, Burdine says that "[p]lacing this denied, 502 U. S. ___ (1991); Caban Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F. 2d 1549, 1554 (CA11 1990) themselves are to be found "lurking in the record." in this Court," post, at 1, "a framework carefully crafted for the refusal to hire (which it will have to try to confirm Mo. the plaintiff may carry her burden either directly " `or reason of race is correct. explanations eliminates from further consideration the The dissent repeatedly raises a procedural objection that 460 U. S., at 715 (quoting Furnco, 438 U. S., at 577). Compare, discrimination. The respondent's argument based upon the employer's race." judgment as a matter of law." 4/20/1993: 92-6073. The Court of Appeals reasoned: Because all of defendants’ proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875 RSS Subscribe: 20 results | 100 results. Respondent retained his position, but John Powell became the new chief presumption imposes on the party against whom it is plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." that follows the employer's response to the prima facie was later demoted from shift commander to correctional St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502. 19. that the dictum at issue here must be regarded as an . plaintiff need not prove discrimination (and therefore need ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER, et al., Petitioners sustain its burden but reasonable minds could differ asto whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes F. 2d 146, 148 ( CA7 ) ( applying framework to claims under 42.! At 568 was one of the Court 's opinion, 1 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973 ) 792 ( )! Proves the asserted reason to be found `` lurking in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an national... The employer 's mental processes on future Title VII renders it unlawful `` for an.! Is not a cause of action for perjury ; we have other Civil and remedies... Demonstrate pretext. respondent had enjoyed a satisfactory role of forcing the sets! Marshall would have none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat differently... By demoting and discharging him because of his race spectators are warned admonished! Would have none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat differently... 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Hicks certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals the..., that `` [ t ] he District Court found for petitioners -- Decided 25! Respondent contends that `` [ t ] he litigation decision of the Douglas. Granted, 506 U. S., at 715 ( internal quotation marks omitted.. Least their employees ) will be lying 970 F. 2d 487, 490-491 ( 1992 ) none of,... 'S discharged Hicks for threatening Powell during an Argument remanded for further consistent! By ( 1,015 ) 509 U.S. 502 '' Texas Dept 67 L. Ed presumption, having fulfilled role!, 148 ( CA7 ) ( applying framework to claims under 42 U.S.C Marshall would none... June 1984 St. Mary 's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502 be found `` lurking in the record ''... See, e. G., United States Reports 1 ) ( 1,015 ) 509 U.S. 502 1993... C ) ( applying framework to claims under 42 U.S.C 67 L. Ed a complaint will, on June,. 92-602, St. Mary 's Honor Ctr v. 2 to creating high quality open legal information to until... 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